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Abstract 
Liberalism is that ideology, that worldview, which values, in an ever-evolving set of intelligently intermingled 
thoughts: democracy, freedom (liberty), equality (justice), fraternity (solidarity), the pursuit of happiness, 
pluralism (diversity), and human rights – and explores the ever-open ever-possible futures of their rediscovery 
and advance. The study of ways in which social movements relate to third sector/nonprofit or voluntary 
organizations can be structured, if we choose, as a liberal endeavor. That is the message I receive from Antonin 
Wagner’s (2012) telling of the emergence of a field that focuses its study and developmental energies on place 
of intermediate associational life in modern society, from Adalbert Evers’ efforts to sustain the welfare state in 
an era of untrammeled capitalism (2013), and from Roger Lohmann’s (1992) comprehensive vision of a social 
commons capable of assuring the values of liberal society. 
 
This paper sets the theory of liberal democracy in a contemporary cosmopolitan context, drawing on case 
material from Hungary, Northern Ireland, and the United States. 
 
 
 
The creation of cosmopolitan civil society is essentially a liberal construction. And liberal 
constructions are typically, if not necessarily, rooted in the theory and practice of democracy. 
This paper explores the path from liberal democracy to cosmopolitan civil society. Along this 
path, I follow the observation of the liberal democratic theorist, Roland Pennock1, who 
                                                          
1 Pennock was a leading theorist of liberal democracy over a wide span of the 20th century. Less flamboyant 
than Benjamin Barber and certainly less recognized, he spent his career teaching at Swarthmore College, and 
authored several influential books on democracy as well as editing a number of Nomos volumes. I should add 
that his honors seminar on Political Theory at Swarthmore, in which I participated in 1959 as a rising junior at 
that college, provided intellectual grist and inspiration for a number of my own writings, in particular Mapping 
the Third Sector (1978).  
 
36   Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.7, No.1, 2015 
observed that the theorist’s job is ‘to speculate and to interpret the facts as he sees them’ 
(Pennock, in Pennock and Chapman 1969, pp. 285-286).  
 
I begin by recalling insights from three leading theorists—the Swiss economist Antonin 
Wagner (2012), the German political scientist Adalbert Evers (2011, 2013) and the American 
social welfare scholar Roger Lohmann (2015)—who define key concepts related to society’s 
third sector and civil society. I then proceed to set these contentions into the context of liberal 
and democratic thought, the field that Pennock explored in a lifetime of scholarship. I present 
three case studies of Hungarian liberal democracy under stress and in retreat. And I conclude 
with a consideration of the uplifting research of cosmopolitan development by sociologist 
Elijah Anderson (2011) and cultural historian Herbert J. Muller (1952). 
 
Beginning with Wagner: Liberalism provides the key to resolving the fundamental distinction 
between managerialist approaches and the participatory emphasis of civil society. Then 
Lohmann: Democracy is at the core of many personal and social aspirations in modern 
societies. Finally to Evers: If we want to construct a civil society, we need first to understand 
‘civility’.  
 
Wagner places a central focus on the concept of ‘intermediate organization’, drawing on the 
1969 Nomos yearbook, co-edited by Pennock and John Chapman, on the subject of Voluntary 
Associations. By this choice, Wagner moves directly into the path of the highly significant 
social/political theory of Liberalism.  
 
Lohmann (2015), who also draws on Pennock’s seminal work, asserts that ‘Democracy is 
increasingly more than a theory of government. It is a principle by which we seek to conduct 
aspects of our daily lives. Voluntary action in the wider third sector beyond government, the 
market order and the intimate sphere has emerged as a powerful expression of the widespread 
wish for more democratic social relations in civil society.’ 
 
Evers (2011), taking an ‘all-and’ rather than an ‘either-or’ approach, asserts the greater 
significance of civil society conceptions that incorporate not only actions and organizations 
within a bounded third sector, but also address broader concerns of deliberation, civicness, 
and civility throughout all corners and all institutions of society.  
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Anchored in the history of social and political theory, the core values of the liberal tradition 
are best expressed in the aspirations of the American and French revolutions. Pennock (1950, 
pp. 11-12) sees in liberalism the elaboration of interaction between three basic values: 
progress, natural law, and equality. Liberal democracy (or what he later called pluralistic 
democracy) is the structured decision-making system that becomes a ‘way of life’ providing 
an ‘equal right to liberty and happiness’ and to ‘equality before the law’ (pp. 16-17). 
 
The development of this world view is powerfully described in the writings of the cultural 
historian Herbert J. Muller (1952, 1966), who himself gives a long quote to Ortega y Gasset, 
who said it as well as it can be stated: 
 
Liberalism is the supreme form of generosity; it is the right which the majority 
concedes to minorities and hence it is the noblest cry that has ever resounded in 
this planet. It announces the determination to share existence with the enemy; 
more than that, with an enemy which is weak. It was incredible that the human 
species should have arrived at so noble an attitude, so paradoxical, so refined, so 
acrobatic, so anti-natural. Hence, it is not to be wondered at that this same 
humanity should soon appear anxious to get rid of it (quoted in Muller 1966, pp. 
387-388). 
 
Liberalism is that ideology, that worldview, which values, in an ever-evolving set of 
intelligently intermingled thoughts: democracy, freedom (liberty), equality (justice), 
fraternity (solidarity), the pursuit of happiness, pluralism (diversity), and human rights--and 
explores the ever-open ever-possible futures of their rediscovery and advance. The study of 
ways in which social movements relate to third sector/nonprofit/civil society/ voluntary 
organizations can be structured, if we choose, as a liberal endeavor.  
 
Civil Society and Liberal Democracy 
The word ‘liberal’, of course, is one of the most confusing and polysemic in the lexicon of 
social analysis. Originally developed as a way of justifying capitalistic liberties as a 
replacement for feudalism, it took on a strong political cast following the American and 
French revolutions – signifying the active participation of the citizenry in governance and 
public administration. With the rise of centralized, and later authoritarian, approaches toward 
the assurance of social and economic equality, ‘liberalism’ moved to the political center – 
between the ‘right’ of untrammeled capitalism and the ‘left’ of various experiments with 
socialism and communism. 
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In contemporary parlance, ‘liberal’ continues to be appropriated to a variety of uses: in 
‘liberal’ studies to assure a wide range of open intellectual exploration; in ‘neo-liberalism’ as 
a reclamation of capitalist ideological roots; in ‘pointy-headed liberalism’ as an effort by non-
conservatives to besmudge their intellectual opponents as secret or misguided agents of 
conspiracy. 
 
Following Pennock, I would assert that, to be a useful concept of social science, liberalism 
needs to be specified into an institutional mode. It is too general an idea to be of analytic use 
in itself, but becomes increasingly powerful when modified, for example, as ‘economic’, 
‘social’, or ‘political’. And most useful of all becomes its delineation in terms of ‘liberal 
democracy’ or, to use a closely related term, ‘pluralistic democracy’.2 
 
Michael Edwards’s influential work on civil society (2009) presents three basic puzzles to be 
solved: 1) civil society as associational life; 2) civil society as the good society; and 3) civil 
society as the public sphere. No one of these approaches, he asserts, offers the one best or 
exclusive resolution. Rather, ‘civil society gains strength both as an idea and as a vehicle for 
social change when the weaknesses of one set of theories are balanced by the strength and 
contributions of the others’ (2009, p. 82). 
 
Perhaps there’s something of a dialectic at work. Civil society Type 1 mediates between 
polity and economy in the two-sector view of society handed down through the centuries by 
classic theoretical conceptions, from Plato to Hobbes to Locke to Smith to Marx. It’s the 
thesis. Civil society Type 2 appears with the recognition that society’s ‘third sector’ has a 
shape and standing of its own, and might be recognized as at least somewhat ‘independent’. 
That’s the antithesis. 
 
Comes then the synthesis: Civil Society Type 3 mediates, yes, but it also stands on its own 
and performs many important functions. But there is more: Civil society also serves to 
actualize the values and processes of liberal or pluralistic democracy – and not just in the 
third sector, but also in government and politics. And, as if not yet enough, maybe in (at least) 
other parts of the economy, like cooperative and participative businesses. And why not within 
                                                          
2 Here I recall the remarkable work of William Kornhauser (1959). 
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the family and kin structures themselves – aching for ways of accommodating the aspirations 
for women and children and grandparents for roles that provide them with the satisfactions of 
participating in decisions and actualizing their own aspirations?3 
 
It is a truly cyclical process. Liberal democracies may actualize themselves by adopting the 
best practices of civil society construction: dialogue and deliberation, civic participation, 
active and civil listening, and learning behaviors. And in return, civil organizations and 
polities and corporations and families may come to recognize that they can function best if 
they adopt the principles and practices of liberal and pluralist democracy.  
 
Uncivil Democracy and the Problem of Majority Rule 
But there is a big problem with contemporary democracy: It is not working very well, as we 
see in country after country in the 21st century (Diamond 2015, but see Fisher 2013.) For 
democracy contains, if not contradictions, at least some important areas of tension, and they 
surround its linchpin idea: the principle of majority rule (Pennock 1979, p. 7). The will of the 
majority may be qualified, democratic theory asserts, by insistence on the protection of 
minority rights or actions requiring ‘supermajorities’, but the fundamental principle requires 
that all citizens have the right to vote, and that ‘plurality is determinative’ (Ibid.). 
 
In the contemporary democracy of the United States, pluralities come and go, often achieving 
only the narrowest of electoral victories as the revolving doors of electoral success and failure 
transform one term’s ‘ins’ into tomorrow’s ‘outs’. Traditions of loyal opposition, partially 
learnt from the mother country (England), receive in the heat of contemporary politics only 
the most occasional of lip service. In an era of fierce polarization between center and right 
(and far right as well), the fundamental rule of politics becomes: ‘You be the leader; I’ll be 
the assassin.’ 
 
The assassin’s weapon of choice typically involves what can be gotten away with. In the 
USA, it is usually (but not always) non-lethal, but nonetheless devastating: the big lie, the 
personal smear, the appeal to fear, the questioning of legitimacy (even of birth), the hint of 
limited capacity on the basis of race/ethnicity/religion/gender/age/sexual preference, etc.  
 
                                                          
3 The present author has been making this point for quite a while. See Van Til 1988. 
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This brutal game lowers the quality of governance, assuring that insult and derogation set the 
tone for political discourse, and stalemate becomes the frequent result of policy outcomes. In 
Hungary, where I twice served as Fulbright Specialist, it often appears that denigrating the 
opponent becomes more attractive to political participants than achieving electoral success. 
There, one party has achieved an unassailable super-majority, but that does not prevent them 
from relentless efforts to denigrate and control their political opposition. 
 
There seems to be something in the human being, likely built into the beast and then 
encouraged by culture, that exults in humiliating the opponent. Popular culture shows this in 
the Anglo nations: a self-seeking Francis Urquardt (unforgettably played by Ian Richardson 
in the BBC TV series House of Cards) was transformed nearly a decade later into the 
American political hack Francis Underwood, just as heartless but a bit less nuanced, at least 
as depicted by Kevin Spacey. Brutality seems to edge out brilliance as incivility spreads. 
Macbeth, and Lady Macbeth, redux. 
 
In the modern democracy, both majorities and minorities join forces to spoil the political 
commons. Hungarian prime minister Orban flaunts his supermajority and invites his 
opponents to leave the field (literally, by migrating to other countries), while the parties that 
might take advantage of his lack of respect find it impossible to either join forces or articulate 
an alternative vision of policy and governance. In the United States, President Obama 
doggedly repeats his call for inter-party cooperation, but fails to find ways of making deals or 
bargains, grand or not, with his adversaries. Whether political, nonprofit, or corporate – 
devotees of obstructionism all seem determined rather to be ‘right’ than responsible – or 
indeed, effective at the enterprise of governing. 
 
Examples from Northern Ireland, another location in which I performed Fulbright service, are 
here both instructive and more heartening. For three decades in the late 20th century, 
government in that province of the United Kingdom was in effect replaced by violent 
paramilitary organizations that captured large segments of its all-too-active third sector. In 
the years leading up to the cease-fire of 1994 and, ultimately, the Good Friday agreement of 
1998, nonviolent nonprofit organizations played a crucial role in assuring social welfare and 
sustaining public peace during those troubled times (Birrell and Williamson 2001).  
 
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.7, No1, 2015 41 
Moreover, the Good Friday agreement provided a means of assuring the electoral minority, 
and the majority as well, a clearly delineated, predictable, and influential role in the 
governance of the country. The exhaustive understanding between the major ethno-national-
religious-political segments of that society that was hammered out in the agreement, and then 
validated by a referendum requiring consent of the major solidaries, stands as one of the great 
accomplishments of conflict resolution in modern times. If total peace and harmony has not 
come to prevail in Northern Ireland, this has more to do with the time required to move 
beyond the horrors of civil war than it does with flaws in the agreement and what it 
prescribed. The image of former guerrilla leaders standing hand to hand in shared 
governmental roles gives hope for the success of civil democracy in other divided nations 
throughout the world. 
 
The point, then, is that liberal democracy, if it is to function smoothly and well, requires 
civility (cf Shils 1977). And civility is strong, though certainly not universal, in the currency 
of the third sector, and is beginning to be seen, as we have noted in the discussion of Evers 
(2011), as a linchpin of a whole and civil society. Majority rule, the basic principle of 
democracy, often fails to provide stability in an era of continuing disenchantment with 
governmental outcomes. The revolving door of parties, the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ exchanging places, 
perhaps after enjoying the brief light of supermajority rule, becomes inescapable in nearly 
every society in a globe exceeding its carrying capacity. In such times as ours, national 
governments will continually fail to meet the expectations their citizens hold for them, and if 
the party scene is reasonably competitive, will fall from power after one or two terms. 
 
A set of unpleasant alternatives face democracies in this situation. There is the American 
alternative: continuous political strife between the ins and the outs – each knowing (or at last 
believing) that their roles will be reversed in an upcoming election, and that therefore it 
makes little sense to try to do too much (more being easier to block than less) while in power, 
or to cooperate at all while out of power (as the time is rapidly advancing when they will hold 
the reins once more). Hardly more attractive is the Hungarian choice: abandoning liberal 
democracy for a more permanent domination of regime – revamping electoral laws, voting 
eligibilities, and constitutions themselves; building political machines in which winners take 
all and losers get blacklisted; hanging onto power through electoral victories in the face of 
widespread public disapproval. On the one hand then, uncivil stalemate; on the other, illiberal 
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democracy by manipulated majorities. Thus appears not just the desirability, but perhaps even 
the need for liberal, pluralistic, and civil democracy.  
 
Three cases follow, each touching on contemporary Hungary and presented to suggest 
openings to a basic question I have sought to answer throughout my career (cf. Van Til 1988, 
2008): How can we create a liberal, pluralist, and civil form of democracy in our national 
politics, in our third sector/nonprofit/civil organizations, in our businesses and corporations, 
and in our family and kinship structures? 
  
Case 1: Resurgent Civic Activism and a Hungarian Memorial 
Throughout the months following his overwhelming re-election in 2014 as prime minister of 
Hungary, Viktor Orban’s government carried on an increasingly bitter disagreement with 
important forces within Budapest’s Jewish community. The major representative organization 
of that community, Mazsihisz, had, over this period, taken an unprecedentedly independent 
stance toward the regime of Orban’s ruling party, Fidesz. 
 
Mazsihisz publicly objected to major appointments to several state-initiated projects marking 
the 70th anniversary of the German Nazi occupation of Budapest, and the drastic increase in 
the level of Holocaust atrocity this occupation provoked in Hungary. Most visibly, this lead 
Jewish organization took a public role in opposing the construction of a highly controversial 
and poorly conceived statue proposed by the government to mark this anniversary. In an 
unprecedented fashion, Maszihisz rejected the offer of state funding to support several 
community-based remembrance activities of the 1944 events. In a country long accustomed 
to dependence on governmental funding of religious organizations, this rejection of financial 
support from the government was important news indeed.  
 
As the official monument took form, protesters sought to restrict its construction, but police 
protection quickly restrained such efforts. But at the same time, protestors had begun to 
create a ‘living monument’ on the square, itself the location of the American Embassy, a 
venerable monument to the Soviet Union, and an iconic statue of Ronald Reagan. Visitors 
began to bring mementos of the Hungarian past and assemble them around the construction 
site. At the current writing (early 2015), the living memorial expands in its scope and impact 
every day, while behind it, the misleading and official monument finds its role as a mere 
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backdrop to a greater power of civic imagination that dominates its foreground (Van Til 
2014). 
 
Case 2: A Government Takes on Civil Society 
In today’s Hungary, a duly elected government seems bent on creating a one-party state that 
controls nearly every aspect of the country’s life – public, commercial, civic, voluntary, and 
even religious. And this monolith is steadily reducing the capacity of the Third Sector to 
provide for citizen initiative and participation.  
 
Prime Minister Orban has secured lasting power for himself by utilizing governing 
techniques he learned as an oppositional movement leader fighting the Sovietized autocracy 
of the late 1980s. Whatever he does seems to work, at least in assuring repeated re-election. 
In both 2010 and 2014 his ruling party, Fidesz, secured a two-thirds majority in Parliament, 
allowing it to reshape the constitution of the country at every overnight whim. Variously 
identified by its critics as a ‘mafia’, ‘octopus’ or ‘Franken’-State, practicing ‘crony 
capitalism’ within the context of an ‘operetta state’ inside a ‘goulash archipelago’of 
‘Orbanistan’, the government of ‘Viktator’ Orban functions as a highly effective political 
machine.4  
 
The Third Sector has been turned inside-out in Orban’s Hungary. Philanthropy finds itself 
subject to state control and direction; the participatory processes of civil society find 
themselves closely sniffed by the big nose of the state in the form of blacklists and grants 
favoritism; and the independence of what Americans have come to call the (at least partially) 
‘independent sector’ is reduced to a set of complaisant organizations placed on what political 
scientist Merle Fainsod (1958) identified as the ‘transmission belt’ of an authoritarian society. 
 
A rather bizarre case in point is found in a contemporary conflict between the Norwegian 
government, acting as a philanthropist to Hungary under the peculiar folkways of the 
European Community, and the Hungarian government, which took exception to a grant 
awarded to a nonprofit organization it found too closely associated to a rival political party.  
 
According to press reports5, Hungary’s position was that:  
                                                          
4 See Krasztev and Van Til, forthcoming, for discussion of these identifications. 
5 http://www.politics.hu/20140515/pms-office-to-respond-this-week-to-norway-on-grants-suspension/  
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It would like Norway to extend the suspension over the three funds disbursing 
monies allocated to civil organisations and to renegotiate the entire programme 
structure of the scheme. The most important aim in connection with the Norway 
Grants scheme is to ensure that only state bodies should fulfil tasks connected 
with the management of funding… Norwegian funding for NGOs is currently 
transferred through (a) Foundation which appears to be an NGO but in reality is 
a satellite organization’ of (a) small opposition party. 
 
So, the brave new world of the Hungarian Third Sector is revealed: Grants may be received 
from sources outside the government, but only if they are managed by the government and 
are directed to organizations it approves.  
 
So much for encouraging philanthropic giving – ‘give only to me’ is the government’s 
message. So much for an independent Third Sector—‘organize only what we approve’ is the 
government’s message. So much for encouraging civil processes of social participation and 
innovation in the civil sector—’do only what we tell you’ is the government’s message to its 
Third Sector leaders. 
 
Case 3: Making a Debater’s Point against Liberal Democracy 
Little and landlocked, Hungary re-entered the purview of international news following a 
remarkable speech by Prime Minister Orban on July 26, 2014. Within a week, commentary 
and editorials appeared in the Financial Times, the New York Times, the Washington Post, 
and Newsweek expressing distress with Orban’s comments about the virtues of ‘illiberal 
democracy’ and his apparent admiration of the national leadership of such countries as Russia 
and Turkey. Within a couple of months, even Bill Clinton and Barack Obama found 
themselves referring to these comments in disdainful terms. 
 
The speech6, delivered at a summer youth camp located in Tusnádfürdő, a heavily Hungarian 
region in Romania, took the form of a professorial presentation while providing important 
content regarding Hungary’s crucial though precarious geopolitical position. Increasingly a 
buffer between an expanding Russia and a worried EU, and highly dependent on both forces 
for its economic viability, Orban’s Hungary is in the process of a massive concentration of its 
economic and social institutions under governmental control. It is also implementing a 
                                                          
6 http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-
july-2014/  
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dramatic repositioning of its economy, relying on Russian assistance for an expansion of 
nuclear power and exchanging large segments of its intelligentsia (by out-migration) for 
manual workers from the Hungarian sections of neighboring Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia. 
Orban’s speech bears careful consideration both for its content and its implications for global 
political futures. 
 
The speech is notable for its rejection of key aspects of liberal democratic thought – among 
which were mentioned the welfare state, the role of nongovernmental organizations (seen as 
agents of foreign power), and the influence of the European Union itself. Emphasizing 
national values and the development of a ‘workfare state’ as a new path to development, 
Orban inspired Gyorgi Schopflin7, one of his principal admirers, to state that it may be 
assumed ‘that a decade from now, the Tusnádfürdő speech will be remembered as a valiant 
and brave forerunner of the required changes. Of course, it might not. But then democracy 
will be in big trouble.’  
 
To be sure, social relations in Hungary show little experience with the democratic niceties of 
intergroup collaboration, and its leaders have historically exhibited cooperative skills at least 
as rarely as their citizens. Hungary’s rulers tend to be remembered for their military losses 
and their authoritarian governing styles. Indeed, Orban, the land’s most recent ruler, already 
receives nine citations in The Dictator’s Handbook.8  
 
Toward a Cosmopolitan Canopy for Civil Democracy 
Liberal democracy, if it is to survive and thrive, is built on the mutual respect of citizens. 
Novelist and sociologist Richard Sennett has documented the wastage involved in building a 
‘purified identity’ on the basis of characteristics as inconsequential as skin color, family of 
origin, religion, nation, or other accidents of birth. A competitive and productive society, as 
social theorist Talcott Parsons (1966) noted, is based on what is accomplished and achieved, 
and not on what is ascribed and incidental. As the content of the Unionist identity fades with 
the distancing of the English from Northern Ireland, and barriers to racial minorities and 
women fade in the United States and many other parts of the world, the triviality apparent in 
basing identity on differences is bound to emerge less vividly with the passing of time and 
generations. 
                                                          
7 http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/pdf/Aspen%20EN.pdf 
8 Written by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, published in 2011 by PublicAffairs. 
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Social psychologist Louis Zurcher (1977) found in his work that the modern identity often 
takes the form of the ‘mutable self’, capable of adjusting to differing social situations. Many 
middle-class professionals in Northern Ireland have developed skills in mutability that permit 
them to place their ethno-national-religious identity into the background at work, in the 
neighborhood, in mixed marriages, and in other broader walks of life.  
 
Citizens of the modern world may be faced with choices involving too many potential 
identities – national, religious, political, strategic, residential, and the like. And it may be the 
ambiguities involved in choosing a national identity that give rise to the most serious of these 
confusions.  
 
Certainly these questions were not easily resolved, and indeed not all have been, in Northern 
Ireland (cf. Van Til 2007). In divided societies there remains the temptation to tolerate the 
‘tall fences’ and ‘peace walls’ that aim to provide comfort through what would otherwise 
appear self-destructive segregation. At the same time, however, there are lessons of diversity 
that will have to be learned in societies less extremely divided--such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Hungary--lest the rising generation in these lands fall hopelessly 
behind in the quest for personal and professional advantage in the universalist structures of 
the global economy and society. 
 
Comfort notwithstanding, there’s a strong case to be made that the 21st century citizen needs 
to learn to swim in a bigger pool, at least from time to time. The dilemma was dramatically 
cast by sociologist Louis Wirth, in his classic 1928 study of The Ghetto. Wirth described the 
choice faced by the ‘marginal man’, readied by education and training to leave the ghetto in 
which he was born, and take his place in a multi-cultural world: 
 
The difficulty is that the Jew, as long as he remains in the ghetto, is of a 
separate caste, living in a world that is narrow, but warm with the flow of 
familiar life, full of sentiment, and with opportunity for self-expression within 
the limits of the group. But when he emerges from the ghetto he becomes 
human, which means he has contacts with the outer world, encounters friction 
and hostility, as well as familiarity and friendship…(1928, p. 267). 
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Sociologist Elijah Anderson (2011) writes of what he calls ‘cosmopolitan canopies’, ‘public 
spaces within cities (that) offer a respite from… wariness (of those who seem different), 
settings where a diversity of people can feel comfortable enough to relax their guard.’ 
Anderson describes everyday life within the Reading Terminal Market in Philadelphia, where 
as visitors  
 
stroll up and down the aisles, stopping at various shops and kiosks, they 
experience other people, and they generally seem to trust what (and whom) they 
see… When taking a seat at a lunch counter, people feel they have something of 
a license to speak with others, and others a license to speak to them. The author, 
an African American, was tapped on the shoulder by a total stranger, a ‘red-
faced’ Irishman, asking about the score of a basketball game – not something 
that would occur out on the street. What is so striking about sitting at a lunch 
counter in the Reading Terminal is that in this setting, a white man with white 
supremacist friends is able to have a frank conversation with a black stranger. In 
these settings people engage in folk ethnography and formulate or find evidence 
for their folk theories about others with whom they share the public space (2011, 
p. 36). 
 
Creating cosmopolitan canopies is never an easy task, as these constructions rest on a 
confluence of built, cultural, social, and political structures. The built environment in most 
societies provides potential canopies within its physical structures. These ‘third places’ 
(Oldenburg 1989) – markets, like Philadelphia’s Reading Terminal, which exist in varying 
forms throughout the world; coffee houses like Budapest’s Tranzit Art café; bookstores that 
bring authors together with readers; school and church halls that lie unused many hours of the 
week – provide the turf from which the cosmopolitan canopy may sprout. 
 
The cultural requisites for successful bridging interactions (cf. Putnam and Goss 2002) 
involve, at the individual level, a willingness to explore relations across divisions of race, 
religion, class, ethnicity, and gender by means of simple conversation (Wheatley 2002). 
Some cultures seem better suited to such interaction than others. The Irish, for example, seem 
able to strike up conversations on their weather with great ease and frequency. Hungarians, 
while typically confining their conversation to persons known to them, benefit from a long 
experience with classlessness in the post-war era and often burst into conversation with 
strangers while shopping or on the tram. Perhaps those of the varieties of Anglo heritage are 
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most retarded in this capacity, trained from the outset to be able to talk easily only with ‘their 
own kind’. Forthcoming research on the dynamics of cosmopolitan canopies awaits research 
on such differentials. 
 
A third factor affecting cosmopolitan canopies relates to the social segregation of different 
societies. Americans and Hungarians, for instance, tend to live out a good deal of their lives 
in the social silos enforced by residential segregation, political party membership, or church 
affiliation. The walls of these silos are perhaps better breached in the former society than the 
latter by dint of its greater experience with third sector involvement (cf. Zick and associates 
2012), but the recent American turn away from face-to-face association toward computer-
linked mass organization surely takes its toll on the quality of the cosmopolitan canopy.9 
 
The political life of a country also affects the prospects for its cosmopolitan canopies. 
Authoritarian or totalitarian governments look suspiciously on such turf, fearing that seeds of 
dissent and opposition may sprout therein (Krasztev and Van Til 2015 forthcoming). 
However, in both the long and short run, organizations, including countries, may suffer from 
the majoritarian zeal of those elected to office who choose to run it all. Even the strongest 
ruler stands to benefit from citizen interest in resolving society’s problems – especially those 
problems that government seems nearly always unable to resolve – poverty, unemployment, 
pride in ethnicity and life-style, disaster relief, substance abuse, comfort for those in need or 
distress.  
 
Among the anticipated products of the cosmopolitan canopy may be emergent philanthropy, 
the establishment of an independent third sector, and a civil respect for civil society groups, 
ideas, and programs throughout the countries they are elected to serve. Voluntary and 
nonprofit organizations, the linchpins of the third sector, can do much to construct the 
cosmopolitan canopies under which citizens can come together to give voice to the causes 
they value, to relieve the suffering that life places in their paths, and to find comfort in the 
company of friends and neighbors. The social health provided in such organizational spaces 
can substantially aid in co-producing, along with government, the satisfaction and happiness 
of society’s members and citizens. 
                                                          
9 The reader is invited to observe the behavior within the contemporary coffee shop. What, for example, is the 
balance between conversation and individual computer work at its tables? I recall enjoying a fine cup of coffee 
in Chicago’s ‘Intelligentsia Café’ a few months back, and noting that every table was taken by customers 
absorbed by their computers, each sitting individually without a live partner for conversation or deliberation.  
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Contemporary autocracies such as Orban’s Hungary, Erdogan’s Turkey, and Putin’s Russia 
leave little room for ideas like deliberative democracy, citizen participation, income 
redistribution, social diversity, or human rights. These governments, it would seem, act to 
hollow out democratic and pluralist institutions in order to create their own response to the 
challenges of contemporary geopolitics. 
 
Some Practical Suggestions and a Conclusion 
Several practical suggestions emerge from the discussion above, which if followed might 
enhance the quantity and quality of cosmopolitan canopies within contemporary society: 
 
• At every level of social structure – individual, organizational, sectoral, societal – civil 
interaction and dialogue has its place.  
• Civility is a skill that can be learned, and indeed must be learned, if individuals, 
organizations, sectors and societies are to function in mutual respect, a necessary 
modicum of social peace, and an appreciation of diversity.  
• Civil dialogue can be built into the bones of a well-designed community. The 
cosmopolitan canopy facilitates dialogue and diversity, which are themselves 
prerequisites of whole persons, civil organizations, workable democracies, and 
peaceful liberal societies.  
 
The liberal response to the inevitability of differences in opinion and preference in society 
typically posits a central role for dialogue and deliberation, not dictation and persuasion. 
Dialogue and deliberation play central roles theories of deliberative democracy, like those of 
Habermas (1998), which are often seen to involve a more direct conception of democracy 
than the mediated forms of pluralist democratic thought. But if people and organizations are 
to disagree with each other, both privately and publicly, as is inevitable in a liberal society, 
structured dialogue and deliberation may allow them to do so in a civil and non-destructive 
manner.  
 
A further contribution of effective dialogue and deliberation comes from the possibilities 
these participatory approaches provide for the actual resolution of even the deepest of human 
conflicts. Harold Saunders developed the sustained dialogue methodology by means of the 
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shuttle diplomacy that brought about Sadat’s visit to the Knesset in 1977 (Saunders 1999) and 
the techniques in these approaches have since been developed in a variety of venues (cf. 
Lohmann and Van Til 2011).  
 
Liberal conceptions of society develop and accept a full, albeit tragic, vision of history and 
life.10 Claudia Horwitz (in Edwards (ed.) 2011, p. 280) puts it well in the Oxford Handbook: 
‘Marrying a rich inner life dedicated to the cultivation of loving kindness and compassion 
with the practice of new forms of politics, economics and public policy is the key to social 
transformation.’ Such are the challenges that await dialogue and deliberation beneath the civil 
and cosmopolitan canopies of our planet in the years ahead. 
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